The Supreme Court’s new definition of corruption is out of step with what Americans think

[Commentary] In June, the Supreme Court overturned former Virginia governor Robert McDonnell’s conviction for corruption in a unanimous decision. McDonnell had been convicted of corruption for allegedly using the governor’s office to enrich himself by personally hosting events promoting a friend’s business ventures in exchange for more than $165,000 in gifts and loans. The court ruled that his actions were not corrupt because they were not official acts. In effect, the court has defined corruption in a way that requires prosecutors to prove an explicit quid pro quo agreement. This narrow definition is out of line with both public opinion and scholarly research on corruption.

I have argued that looking for bright-line distinctions between corrupt and non-corrupt acts is futile: Rules, roles, and conceptions of justice keep changing, because they are inherently controversial — and so are constantly being revised in further political struggles. First one side defines corruption in a particular way; then another group makes efforts to pull the definition closer to what it thinks. We have seen this shift in our lifetimes. Such controversies over the limits of power are healthy for democracy. In fact, it is less remarkable that the justices have defined corruption in narrow ways than that we expected them to resolve the question in the first place.

[Michael Johnston is the Charles A. Dana professor of political science emeritus at Colgate University.]