Spectrum Auction Theory v. Competition Theory
[Commentary] Congress is weighing spectrum legislation as part of the Payroll Tax Holiday and Everything Else extension. One critical change pushed by House Republicans (with the enthusiastic support of AT&T, surprise surprise . . .) involves whether the FCC should be able to keep companies that have a lot of spectrum (AT&T and Verizon) from bidding on some licenses in the future.
This is called “eligibility restrictions” (i.e., are you eligible to bid in the auction or not). The FCC has authority to impose eligibility restrictions now, but generally doesn’t. As the spectrum gap between AT&T and Verizon and everyone else in the wireless world gets bigger, however, there is some talk of possibly bringing them back. Needless to say, AT&T and its supporters think this is both unfair and bad policy. Others, such as the folks at T-Mobile (now no longer being absorbed into the Bell Borg) have responded to the fairness argument. For myself, I am always deeply suspicious whenever incumbents start arguing about “fairness,” as it usually means “please consider this particular detail in a total vacuum without ever thinking about all the unfair advantages I have, and use my framing because I appeal to basic values and use sports metaphors like ‘level playing field.’” But let’s set that aside and do the cold-hearted policy wonk think. As Paul Krugman occasionally likes to say “economics is not a morality tale.” And in any event, even if we decided this on “fairness,” we’d still want to know the right answers and outcomes, right?
Spectrum Auction Theory v. Competition Theory