What Tim Cook doesn't want to admit about iPhones and encryption
When Hillary Clinton called for a "Manhattan-like project" to find a way for the government to spy on criminals without undermining the security of everyone else's communications, the technology world responded with mockery."Also we can create magical ponies who burp ice cream while we're at it," snarked prominent Silicon Valley investor Marc Andreessen. Clinton's idea "makes no sense," added Techdirt's Mike Masnick, because "backdooring encryption means that everyone is more exposed to everyone, including malicious hackers." It's an argument that's been echoed by Apple CEO Tim Cook, who is currently waging a legal battle with the FBI over its request to unlock the iPhone of San Bernardino (CA) terrorism suspect Syed Rizwan Farook. "You can’t have a backdoor that’s only for the good guys," Cook said in November. There's just one problem: This isn't actually true, and the fight over Farook's iPhone proves it.
Apple has tacitly admitted that it can modify the software on Farook's iPhone to give the FBI access without damaging the security of anyone else's iPhone. Claiming that secure back doors are technically impossible is politically convenient. It allows big technology companies like Apple to say that they'd love to help law enforcement but don't know how to do it without also helping criminals and hackers. But now, faced with a case where Apple clearly can help law enforcement, Cook is in the awkward position of arguing that it shouldn't be required to.
What Tim Cook doesn't want to admit about iPhones and encryption