When does Russian propaganda work — and when does it backfire? Here’s what we found.
After examining Russia’s 2014 disinformation campaign in Ukraine, we found that Russian propaganda has very uneven effects. Whether it sways individuals to vote for pro-Russian candidates — or backfires, and makes them less likely to do so — depends on the political predispositions of the target audience.
Ukrainians who were already predisposed in Russia’s favor found its media message persuasive. But there was another effect of exposure to Russian television, one that’s especially important for the United States and elsewhere. Russian propaganda increased Ukrainian political polarization, pushing individuals on either side of the political spectrum further to the extremes. That’s worrisome in a country already deeply divided along linguistic and regional lines. In short, Russian propaganda doesn’t always change minds; whether it does very much depends on consumers’ prior propensity to believe or disbelieve its biased media message. However, it does further polarize its audience. And that might make it harder for democracies to build consensus — and remain democracies.
[Leonid Peisakhin is assistant professor of political science at New York University-Abu Dhabi. Arturas Rozenas is assistant professor of political science at New York University.]
When does Russian propaganda work — and when does it backfire? Here’s what we found.